Science and its demarcation in the light of the history of ideas : a short outline with apparent and real implications for 'appearance and reality' by Pulte, Helmut
1. INTRODUCTION
The central questions of the following outline1 are motivated both by the topic of
this conference and by a remarkable revival: ‘History of ideas’ denominates a tra-
dition of viewing and doing history which was founded by A. E. Lovejoy in the
1930ties and soon gained considerable influence. Due to a stronger social and
pragmatic coining of history – at least in the sense of  historia rerum gestarum –
and other, more ‘external’ reasons it entered a state of crisis in the 1960ties2. How-
ever, it never disappeared and regained strength during the last decade3 – though
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The idea of ‘science’ (scientia, science, Wissenschaft) changed dramatically in the course of history: While it
was understood as an epistemologically privileged endeavor from antiquity to the 19th century, the status of
science and its demarcation from other intellectual activities became more and more problematic in the
course of the 20th century. This outline sums up findings from ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ of the last 50 years and
argues that history of ideas in this sense can contribute to a topical and balanced understanding of science
that avoids dull scientism and a postmodernist view, which both result from a lack of determination and
demarcation of science.
This short article is an extended and slightly modified version of my introductory address ‘Science
and its Demarcation in the Light of the History of Ideas’, presented at the founding conference ‘Ap-
pearance, Reality and Beyond’ of the History of Ideas Research Centre Krakow in December 2011.
Many thanks to Michel Kowalewicz and the other organizers of the conference for the invitation
and their kind hospitality.
Cf. B. Stolberg-Rielinger: “Einleitung”. In: Ideengeschichte, ed. by id., Stuttgart: Reclam 2010, p. 7.
Some scarce hints must do here in order to underpin this claim: first, the publication of New Dic-
tionary of the History of Ideas, 6 vols., ed. by M. C. Horowitz, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons
2005; second, the foundation of new journals like Ideas in History (Copenhagen: Museum Tuscu-
lanum Press 2006 ff.), Partial Answers: Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas (Baltimore: John





not in the Lovejoyian modular design based on ‘unit ideas’, but as a more dynam-
ical and  amenable historiographical enterprise that tries to integrate social condi-
tions and pragmatic aspects of the respective intellectual areas4. Thus, an
historically interested philosopher of science asks whether – and if so, how – the
history of ideas can contribute to an understanding of what became a widespread
conviction that dominated occidental thinking from the renaissance to the late
19th century and faded away in the course of the 20th century, i. e. the belief that
science uncovers ‘reality’ (as it is) while other intellectual and cultural activities
like literature, art or philosophy either fail to do so or are (at least) loss-making in
comparison to science. The short answer to the first question given in this outline
is a qualified ‘yes’, and the even more truncated answer to the second question is
‘Begriffsgeschichte’: I understand conceptual history in a special sense – Begriffs-
geschichte in the German tradition – both as a method and as a discipline of history
of philosophy, of history of science and of intellectual history in general. It is no
rival of the history of ideas, but rather a certain mode or shape of doing history of
ideas: Begriffsgeschichte aims at understanding structural changes in intellectual his-
tory by analyzing the change of concepts in their linguistic context (super- and
subordinated concepts, antonyms, similar concepts etc.). Thus, concepts them-
selves exhibit a certain temporal structure that reveals the changes and interactions
of human thinking with respect to ‘matters’ or ‘objects’, i. e. to concrete or abstract
referents.5 While Begriffsgeschichte has not yet developed a generally accepted canon
of methods, it brought about a couple of fruitful and influential works which ex-
emplify this approach.6 
third, regarding the German discussion, Ideengeschichte regains attention in the broader historio-
graphical debates. This is exemplified by recent publications, like C. Dutt / P. König / D. Teichert:
„Die Ideengeschichte und ihre Nachbardisziplinen“. In: Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 2, (2008–1),
pp. 110–112 (for the disciplinary context), A. Dorschel: Ideengeschichte. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht 2010 (for a historical framing of the approach); N. Luhmann: „Ideengeschichte in so-
ziologischer Perspektive“. In: Ideenevolution. Beiträge zur Wissenssoziologie, ed. by A. Kieserling, Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp 2008, pp. 234–252 (for the sociological perspective), Die Cambridge School
der politischen Ideengeschichte, ed. by M. Muslow / A. Mahler, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2010
(for the political context) and Ideengeschichte der Bildwissenschaft. Siebzehn Portraits, ed. by J. Probst
/ J. P. Klenner, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2009 (for the context of picture theory and iconol-
ogy).
See, for example, M. Brevir: The Logic of the History of Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2002. See for the change in question also P. Ajouri: „Lovejoy und die Folgen. Lovejoy und die Folgen.
Zur Geschichte der History of Ideas”. In: Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 1, (2008–2), pp. 116–121.
Cf. R. Koselleck: „Hinweise auf die temporalen Strukturen Begriffsgeschichtlichen Wandels“. In:
Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte, ed. by H. E. Bödeker, Göttingen: Wallstein
2002, p. 37. 
The most notable finished works are Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 13 vols., Basel / Stuttgart:
Schwabe [and] Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1971–2007, Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griffe.  Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols., Stuttgart: Klett
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A second historiographical fixation is of equal importance: As history of ideas
in general, Begriffsgeschichte, as I understand it, is no end in itself and therefore
should not be misunderstood as a form of mere antiquarianism. As any history,
its aim is to shed some light on the presence and help to understand and master
current intellectual problems and debates.7 Therefore, and without running into
the pitfalls of teleological reconstructions, the present understanding of science will
play a certain role in what follows: While the traditional understanding unduly
privileged science as an epistemological enterprise, certain tendencies in contem-
porary science and ‘science and technological studies’ (STS), as well as certain
strands of ‘historical epistemology’ influenced by postmodern constructivism har-
bor two dangers: either to succumb to a naïve scientism, which is encouraged by
the irrefutable success of modern science and technology, or to ‘contextualize’ sci-
ence in general terms and thereby to downgrade it to a hackneyed enterprise with
no special epistemological merits. Between Scylla and Charybdis, a more balanced
view is the order of the day.
Begriffsgeschichte may well contribute to such a view: It discriminates between
science and scientism and reveals how the latter gained ground. It is also receptive
to social contexts and institutional shapings of science. However, it does not follow
fashion’s every whim because it brings in a greater staying power of historical grad-
ing and avoids shortsightedness as well as antiquated dogmas. History of ideas in
general can help to avoid both extremes and contribute to a better understand-
ing of science and its demarcation. The following sketch is meant to illustrate this
claim. It rests on various investigations into the Begriffsgeschichte of science (scien-
tia, science, Wissenschaft) from antiquity to the 20th century.
2. CLASSICAL AND MODERN SCIENCE
What can a topical history of ideas – in contrast to other historiographical 
approaches – contribute to identify and demarcate ‘science’ as a specific intellectual
achievement of modern culture from other intellectual adventures? The older his-
tory generally followed traditional philosophy of science and took it for granted
K. Barck / M.  Fontius / D. Schlechtenstedt / B. Steinwuchs / F. Wolfzettel, Stuttgart / Weimar: Metz-
ler 2000. A current journal devoted to this approach is Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 54 vols., ed. by
Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur Mainz, Bonn: Bouvier 1955–1999 / Hamburg: Meiner
2000 ff. For the ongoing historiographical discussion about Begriffsgeschichte, see particularly Begriffs-
geschichte, Diskursgeschichte, Metapherngeschichte, ed. by H. E. Bödeker, Wallstein: Wallstein Verlag
2002; Herausforderungen der Begriffsgeschichte, ed. by C. Dutt, Heidelberg: Winter 2003; R. Koselleck:
Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp 2006. Begriffsgeschichte im Umbruch?, ed. by E. Müller, Hamburg: Meiner 2005,
Die Interdisziplinarität der Begriffsgeschichte, ed. by G. Scholtz, Hamburg: Meiner 2000. 
The historiographical implications of this presupposition are fruitfully analyzed in: A. C. Danto, An-
alytical Philosophy of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965. 
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that science awards humans with a certain type of privileged knowledge: The gen-
eral premise was that science generates invariable, true and indisputable knowledge
of nature and man himself. Generality, truth, a certain  necessity (imposed by de-
ductive or inductive logic), evidence of ‘first principles’ and, in most cases, inde-
pendence of scientific theories from heuristic methods and modes of representations
are the main characteristics of ‘classical science’.8 Obviously, mathematical knowl-
edge, as represented by Euclid’s Elements, by example, played an important role
for the molding of this ideal. To put it shortly: The ‘idea of science’ from Aristotle
via Bacon, Descartes and Kant to the late 19th century was shaped by the convic-
tion that scientific knowledge is epistémé in the traditional sense. Though this idea
has its roots in an ideal of ancient epistemology, it unfolded its strong intellectual
influence not until the great ‘Scientific Revolution’ during the Renaissance took
place – an element of continuity and, so to speak, of retardation hardly noticed
by the scientific ‘revolutionists’ involved, but visible both in the claims they laid
to scientific knowledge and in the metatheoretical reflections of classical empiri-
cism (like Bacon’s) and rationalism (like Descartes’ or Leibniz’s).9 
Therefore, one important aspect – probably even the most dominating one –
of traditional attempts to demarcate science was to draw a line between epistémé
in this strong sense and weaker forms of knowledge, which were not conceived as
evident and certain, but as less transparent and revisable, perhaps even as fallacious
The distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ science applied here is strongly influenced by the
conceptual histories undertaken by A. Diemer and G. König. See, above all, A. Diemer: Was heißt
Wissenschaft? Meisenheim am Glan: Hain 1964. Id.: „Die Begründung des Wissenschaftscharakters
der Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert – Die Wissenschaftstheorie zwischen klassischer und moderner
Wissenschaftskonzeption“. In: Beiträge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert,
ed. by id., Meisenheim am Glan: Hain 1968, pp. 3–62; id.: „Der Wissenschaftsbegriff in historischem
und systematischem Zusammenhang“. In: Der Wissenschaftsbegriff. Historische und systematische Un-
tersuchungen, ed. by id., Meisenheim am Glan: Hain 1970, pp. 3–20. Id. / G. König: „Was ist Wis-
senschaft?“ In: Technik und Wissenschaft, ed. by A. Hermann / Ch. Schönbeck, Düsseldorf: Springer
1991, pp. 3–28. König: „Naturwissenschaften“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 6, ed.
by K. Gründer, Basel: Schwabe 1984, pp. 641–650. König / H. Pulte: „Theorie II. 20. Jh. (Wis-
senschaftstheorie)“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 10, ed. by K. Gründer, Basel:
Schwabe 1998, pp. 1146-1154. Pulte: „Wissenschaft III“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie
vol. 12, ed. by G. Gabriel, Basel: Schwabe 2004, pp. 921–948. Id.: „Wissenschaftstheorie, Wis-
senschaftsphilosophie“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 12, ed. by G. Gabriel, Basel:
Schwabe 2004, pp. 973–981. Extremely useful for these kind of investigations are broader historical
studies about the interactions between science and philosophy. See, above all, E. Cassirer: Das Er-
kenntnisproblem in Philosophie und Wissenschaft der modernen Zeit, 4 vols., Darmstadt: Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1994, and J. T. Merz: A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth
Century, 4 vols., Edinburgh: Blackwood 1896–1914.
For a more detailed analysis of the structural similarities of these different epistemologies with respect
to scientific systems see H. Pulte: Axiomatik und Empirie. Eine wissenschaftstheoriegeschichtliche Un-
tersuchung zur mathematischen Naturphilosophie von Newton bis Neumann. Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft 2005. pp. 29–39 and 66–75.
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and deceiving. Science, according to the classical understanding, grasps the ‘essence’
of things: It was not meant to stick to mere appearance, but to uncover reality.
Though most scientists and philosophers of science realized that their idea of sci-
ence was a projected ideal of science, this demarcation was most often conceived
as a clear-cut one. 
However, the traditional image of science as an epistemologically unique en-
deavor faded away in the course of the 19th century: Science itself underwent dra-
matic changes, which were interpreted by many philosophers and historians as
epistemological disruptions or insurmountable breaks in the process of knowledge
acquisition. The rise of non-Euclidean geometries10 was an important driving force
of this development, but also – and even earlier – foundational changes in math-
ematical physics11 and a general change in the understanding of how (increasingly
formal) mathematical knowledge and experience are related.12 This fundamental
change can be traced in detail by an analysis of the semantics of ‘generality’, ‘truth’
and ‘necessity’ in the respective scientific areas, and it can also be traced in indi-
vidual scientific biographies and oeuvres. The case of Helmholtz is exemplary: At
the beginning of his long and fruitful scientific career, he defended – along Kantian
lines – the claim that scientific knowledge is apodictic. In his later writings, pub-
lished during the last two decades of the 19th century, however, even the most basic
insights of physical geometry and mathematical physics turned out to be hypothet-
ical for him.13
The indicated developments culminated – from an epistemological point of
view – in the early 20th century ‘revolutions’ in physics and a foundational crisis
of mathematics. As Imre Lakatos aptly remarked14, Karl R. Popper was the first
who drew the philosophical consequence of this development: More than any
other philosopher of science of the 20th century, Popper criticized and eventually
demolished the classical understanding of science which was based on an alleged
epistemological privilege of its knowledge. He rather accentuated the opposite
pole: “Our science is not knowledge (epistémé): it can never claim to have attained
truth, or even as substitute for it, such as probability.”15
See R. Torretti: Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré. Dordrecht: Springer 1978.
See Pulte: Axiomatik und Empirie.
See H. Mehrtens: Moderne-Sprache-Mathematik. Eine Geschichte des Streits um die Grundlagen der
Disziplin und des Subjekts formaler Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1990.
For his changing understanding of science, see G. König: „Der Wissenschaftsbegriff bei Helmholtz
und Mach“. In: Beiträge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert vol. 1, ed. by A.
Diemer, Meisenheim am Glan: Hain 1968, pp. 90–114. G. Schiemann: Wahrheitsgewissheitsverlust.
Hermann von Helmholtz‘ Mechanismus im Anbruch der Moderne. Eine Studie zum Übergang von klas-
sischer zu moderner Naturphilosophie, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1997.
I. Lakatos: Philosophische Schriften vol. 1, Braunschweig / Wiesbaden: Vieweg 1982, p. 237.








Modern science in this sense is not to be understood as a categorical and de-
ductively structured system of absolute truths. Instead, it is a hypothetical-deduc-
tive system or propositions which are basically problematic16 – problematic in the
sense that their validity always rests on disputable conditions (observations, other
propositions, or theories). Modern science does no longer accept metaphysical or,
to be more general, philosophical foundations, nor does it share the belief of 19th
century positivism that ‘mere experience’ yields a fundamtentum inconcossum for
theory building. Modern science is autonomous from philosophical justification,
and especially rejects the idea of ultimate justification. Therefore, its knowledge is
basically fallible in character. Scientific method is understood as a means to gain
intersubjective, testable results, but no longer serves as a means to ensure the in-
fallibility of scientific knowledge.
Method in this ‘operational’ rather than epistemological sense, however, became
the new criterion of demarcation in order to separate scientific and non-scientific
knowledge. Many philosophical discussions in the middle of the 20th century fo-
cused on methodological issues, and Popper and other protagonists defended the
special character of science mainly on this ground: Method not as a means to secure
truth, but as a means to make scientific knowledge more reliable than ‘general
knowledge’ and as a guarantee of scientific progress (in the sense of truth-approx-
imation or verisimilitude as a regulative idea of any science).17 Even Thomas S.
Kuhn, who rejected the idea of universal method and truth-approximation, sub-
scribed to progress as an essential feature of the scientific endeavor and used this
feature in order to demarcate scientific and non-scientific knowledge.18
Subsequently, however, and contrary to this modern but non-relativistic idea
of science originated a strong tendency to deny that any demarcation of science
and scientific knowledge is necessary or at least desirable: Paul K. Feyerabend in
his Against Method rejected the claim that science is regulated by general method-
ological principles and characterized by progress: He simply proclaimed that “sci-
ence is an essentially anarchistic enterprise”.19 Likewise, Bruno Latour’s appeal to
“abolish the distinction between science and fiction”20 seemed to make it super-
fluous and ‘old-fashioned’ to look for criteria which may be appropriate to sep-
arate science from other intellectual activities at all. The idea of science was, to a
See Diemer: „Die Begründung des Wissenschaftscharakters der Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert –
Die Wissenschaftstheorie zwischen klassischer und moderner Wissenschaftskonzeption“, p. 67.
See Pulte: „Wahrheitsähnlichkeit“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 12, ed. by G. Gabriel.
Basel: Schwabe 2004, pp. 173–174.
See T. S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago / London: University of Chicago Press
31996, esp. pp. 174–210.
P. K. Feyerabend: Against Method. Outline of an anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: Verso 1982,
p. 17.
See B. Latour: „Politics of Explanation“. In: Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology 
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certain extend, discharged from any special epistemic virtues. As a consequence of
this epistemological deconstruction, science became a subject of historical and social
contextualisations of different types – especially of historical investigations which
stressed the social and material aspects of science. ‘Science and Technology Studies’
(STS) and ‘Historical Epistemology’ are influential and striking examples in this
respect. These new historical trends manifest debits and credits alike, which are
most obvious for STS:21 To the credit side certainly belongs the elaboration of sci-
ence’s social character and the analysis of the role of institutional, experimental
and technical influences on the formation of scientific knowledge. To the debit
side, however, belongs the indisputable fact that they relativized and downgraded
scientific knowledge in epistemological respect, which neither conforms to a thor-
ough analysis of the reliability of this knowledge nor to man’s experience of the
living environement, which today is highly determined by the (perpetually con-
firmed) belief in the dependability of our technological devices based on this 
knowledge.  
Another severe consequence of these historiographical approaches for the tradi-
tional history of ideas is obvious: They undermine not only the epistemological
authority of science, but also the idea that science is strongly shaped by overarching
conceptual and methodological frameworks, which are the bearers of scientific
knowledge and the main subjects of the history of ideas.  
3. SCIENTISM AS MODERN OBSCURANTISM
The development sketched so far has a shady side, which – at first glance – seems
to point in the opposite direction: The present public understanding of science may
be low in general22, but the public estimation of scientific knowledge is – con-
sciously or not – great, and sometimes elevates to religious heights. There is a wide-
spread and unconfined trust in the statements and forecasts of science and our
technological devices resting on them. Scientists are drawing bold and far- reaching
conclusions from their theories, and even anti-scientific movements can count on
the overwhelming but threatening success of science. In addition, parts of philos-
ophy are tracking the ‘scientific train’ and would like to become empirical sciences
of Being. A Study in the History of an Idea. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 1936, p.
166; cf. G. Holton: Science and Anti-Science. Cambridge (Mass.) / London: Harvard University Press
1993, p.153. 
For an analysis and critique of this tradition see the papers in A House Built on Sand. Exposing Post-
modernist Myths about Science, ed. by N. Koertge, New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998.
For some alarming findings with respect to the United States see Holton: Science and Anti-Science,
pp. 147–148. There is no reason to expect that the scientific illiteracy in the U. S. differs fundamen-




themselves: The growing naturalism in analytic epistemology and the philosophy
of mind are very illustrative in this respect. To put it in a nutshell: The present
Zeitgeist is not so much dominated by a critical discussion and evaluation of sci-
entific insights, but by a new and pretty dull scientism.
Scientism, as I understand and use the term, is first of all a world view that is
shaped by estimation of scientific knowledge and methods. As a general wissen-
schaftliche Weltauffassung, it has no derogatory meaning – as conceptual history re-
veals23 –, but describes an integral world conception from the enlightenment
onwards. Most often, however, scientism is used in a pejorative manner, i. e. the
term is connected with the (implicit or explicit) value judgment that such a world
conception is errant, perhaps even dangerous, or at least truncated or onesided.
Such a value judgment may be justified for mainly two reasons: The first one is
that one science – take physics as an historical example – is elevated above other
scientific achievements in order to establish a monistic form of scientism that is
based only on ‘internal’ (and in this sense: uncritical and dogmatic) grounds. The
second one – which today is probably more widespread and influential – is that
results and methods of science are extended to areas where these results and 
methods are by no means justified by sufficient explanatory and methodological
reasons but where, nevertheless, bold conclusions are drawn from these extensions.
In both cases the term ‘scientism’ is rightly used in a derogatory way, and I group
them under the label ‘dull scientism’.
Dull scientism seems to me as one of the most influential of all modern forms
of obscurantism in the Western hemisphere. Already 80 years ago, A. N. Whitehead
analyzed the ongoing development as astutely as usual. His comment in The Func-
tion of Reason deserves to be quoted in extenso:24
Obscurantism is the inertial resistance of the practical Reason […] to the in-
terference with its fixed methods arising from recent habits of speculation. This
obscurantism is rooted in human nature more deeply than any particular sub-
ject of interest. It is just as strong among the men of science as among the
clergy, and among professional men and business men as among the other
classes. Obscurantism is the refusal to speculate freely on the limitations of tra-
ditional methods. It is more than that: it is the negation of the importance of
such speculation, the insistence on incidental dangers. A few generations ago
For the Begriffsgeschichte and the more general historiography of ‘scientism’ see Ch. Demmerling:
„Szientismus“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 10, ed. by K. Gründer, Basel: Schwabe
1998, pp. 872–876. C. Hakfoort: „The Historiography of Scientism: A Critical Review“. In: History
of Science 33, 1995, pp. 375–395, and P. Schöttler: „Szientismus. Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen
Begriffs“. In: NTM. Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 20, 2012, pp.
245–269.
A. N. Whitehead: The Function of Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1929, pp. 34–35.
The inserted quotation „By merit raised to that bad eminence” is not emphasized in the original. It
refers to John Milton’s Paradise Lost, Book 2.
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the clergy, or to speak more accurately, large sections of the clergy were the
standing examples of obscurantism. Today their place has been taken by scien-
tists –
By merit raised to that bad eminence.
The obscurantists of any generation are in the main constituted by the greater
part of the practitioners of the dominant methodology. Today scientific meth-
ods are dominant, and scientists are the obscurantists.
One of the most important dangers of obscurantism is the ‘refusal to speculate
freely on the limitations of traditional methods’, and this is what characterizes dull
scientism in general. Whitehead further stresses the ‘practitioner’s point of view’
and therefore charges scientists with obscurantism. This charge is, of course, in
need of a qualification (as he acknowledges): Fortunately, many (if not most) sci-
entists still understand their endeavor as a critical one and do not propagate ob-
scurantism in the sense of dull scientism. On the other hand, Whitehead’s charge
may be extended beyond the limits of scientific practitioners: Today, parts of phi-
losophy are strongly inclined to apply results which were allegedly ‘proven and
tested’ by the sciences in order to deal with genuinely philosophical problems and
to ‘solve’ them. One topical example for each type of dull scientism must do here:      
First, the example stemming from practiced science: Some physicists working
on the string theory of modern theoretical physics seem to understand this theory
as a modern form of mathematical metaphysics: String theory is understood and
presented as a ‘unifying theory’ of all physical interactions, and thus as a physical
world conception which promises the ‘end of physics’ because no more funda-
mental unifying theory of physics may be developed at all. Unfortunately, the
physical principles of this theory are completely in the dark, and it does not allow
for any testable predictions. However, some of its most prominent exponents claim
that the theory is true, whether it can be backed by empirical evidence or not and
whether it can be falsified by empirical evidence or not. Here, no demarcation ver-
ifiable science and traditional metaphysics seems to be available – ‘practitioner’s
scientism’ at work.25
Second, an example from science that currently afflicts philosophy. Cognitive
scientists present colorful pictures of the human brain in order to ‘explain’ where
the different intellectual faculties (or even consciousness) is located or why there
is no freewill – while they define neither ‘consciosuness’ nor ‘will’ in a way that
clarifies why and how these human characteristics can be subject of such specific
empirical investigation. Unfortunately, many representatives of present philosophy
of mind are consumed by this dull scientism and even try to add ‘philosophical’
See R. Hedrich: „The Internal and External Problems of String Theory: A Philosophical View“. In:
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38, 2007, pp. 261–278 for a thorough discussion of the 
present problems of this theory.
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grist to its mill. While there can be no doubt that cognitive science and neuro-
sciences can yield important results for philosophy in order to understand the sen-
sual perception and cognitive abilities of humans, there can also be no doubt about
the conceptual carelessness26 and the epistemological and methodological short-
comings27 of many contributions to that debate as well as about the general short-
comings of philosophical naturalism as a science-based philosophical doctrine
when it comes to the problem how science and non-science should be demar-
cated.28 The dull ‘philosophical’ scientism which is so common wide-spread in the
present philosophy of mind has (at least) two annoying consequences: In systematic
respect, it is infertile because the results of empirical investigations are uncritically
redoubled rather than analyzed from genuine philosophical points of view. This re-
doubling is neither helpful for the empirical sciences nor for philosophy itself. In
historical respect, it is to a great deal superfluous because it redoubles – unwittingly
of course, i. e. due to a lack of historical education – controversies and doctrines
of the past history of ideas as, inter alia, the Ignorabimus-discussion illustrates.29
This redoubling is irritating for the empirical scientist and boring for the learned
philosopher. The history of ideas might have been help-ful to avoid detours and
blind alleys of recent discussions, but obviously is not present in the narcissistic
discourses which take place in the present philosophy of mind.
Dull scientism in present science and philosophy is an unconsidered heritage
from classical, but not from modern science: It shares the (implicit) assumption
that asserted scientific knowledge is privileged or unique (for reasons whatsoever),
and therefore is not in need of epistemological criticism and methodological re-
flection, but deserves benevolent interpretation and speculation about assumed
consequences. As it holds the view that all our knowledge is based on science and
since it rejects the existence of genuine philosophical problems and methods, it
For a thoughtful analysis of this shortcoming, see P. Janich: Kein neues Menschenbild. Zur Sprache
der Hirnforschung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2009.
Especially in the ‘free will-debate’; cf. B. Falkenburg: Mythos Determinismus. Wieviel erkärt uns die
Hirnforschung? Heidelberg: Springer 2012.
See, for example, the accurate analysis in G. Keil / H. Schnädelbach: Naturalismus. Philosophische
Beiträge. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2000, esp. pp. 38–44.
In this controversy of the late 19th century, provoked by Emil Du Bois-Reymond’s Grenzen des Na-
turerkenntnis from 1872, Friedrich Albert Lange played a considerable role. It was to a great deal an
epistemological discussion about the problem how mental properties and qualities can be explained.
Michael Pauen sums up a notable analysis of the ‘historical’ discussion and recent developments in
philosophy of mind like this: “A diagnosis of the problem that largely anticipates the present discus-
sion can only be found in Lange and Du Bois-Reymond. This holds especially for the demarcation
of the epistemological problem of the explanation of mental properties and the metaphysical problem
of identification of mental and physical properties.” See M. Pauen: „Die Grenzen des Erkennens.
Von Du Bois-Reymond zur aktuellen Philosophie des Geistes“. In: Weltanschauung, Philosophie und
Naturwissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert, vol. 3: Der Ignorabimus-Streit, ed. by K. Bayertz / M. Gerhard
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has a simple answer to the problem of how to distinguish between ‘appearance
and reality’: Science is the ‘royal road’ to reality, and there is no place for appear-
ance.
Seen from this angle, dull scientism ironically enough shares a characteristic
with the postmodernist tradition of epistemologically downgrading science, which
was described as a problematic und unwelcome consequence of modern science
earlier: The latter tradition, stressing the constructivist (and in so far ‘apparent’)
character of all scientific achievements, is neither interested in a reflection and defi-
nition of proper limits of science. In so far as both opposed positions fail to deter-
mine science – as a central subject of both parties – and its demarcation, both can
be described as ‘ideological’ from the point of view of philosophy of science.
4. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF HISTORY OF IDEAS
I would like to sum up and to draw some conclusions with respect to the central
questions I started with. Science is not the ‘royal road’ to the understanding of re-
ality. Science is neither an arbitrary parlor game of modern civilization, nor is it
primarily an instrument to exert power, nor can it be reduced to its material prac-
tices and technological applications. In order to enable science to yield an impor-
tant contribution to an understanding of reality, its epistemological premises, the
reliability of its methods, the range of its consequences and the legitimacy of its
techniques and operations constantly have to be checked and evaluated. This is
partly a business of science itself, but partly also a non-scientific task that involves
philosophical, historical, sociological and other epistemological interests and meth-
ods. In this sense, science is not ‘autonomous’, and never will be. However, scien-
tific interests, as I understand them, are not alien to such interests, but akin:
Science, as the legitimate heritage of traditional philosophy of nature is striving
for a theoretical understanding of nature and man’s place in nature. The aim of
proper science is to transcend the appearance of things and to gain reliable theo-
retical insight into reality. In order to achieve this aim, science itself must be in-
terested in the range of its own possibilities and limits. It is the neglect of this
character of science which causes many of the confusions about science in modern
civilization.   
This outline is a plea for integrating the history of ideas into this common proj-
ect. To be sure: Topical history of ideas cannot turn back the clock and should not
try to do so. Neither can we return to Lovejoy’s ‘unit-ideas’ as a historiographical
key, nor can we restore the traditional ideal of ‘science’ as epistémé. This would be
vain and historically uninformed attempts. What we need is a history of ideas that
takes the social and material aspects of science seriously without giving up the
leading idea that science is an intellectual venture that, first of all, does not aim at
power. Rather, it is a pursuit for truth, a regulative idea. A history of ideas in this
sense has to uncover the leading conceptual frameworks of science, which often
originate from metaphysics, and it has to show how they were transformed into
empirical, testable and confutable science. It also has to uncover the leading
methodological principles and epistemic virtues of science and how they are a-
dapted to specific social and material circumstances.
This business can only be done successfully if the history of ideas itself pays spe-
cial attention to the demarcation problem. In turn, this problem can successfully
dealt with only if some normative requirements are accepted: Whether scientific
claims in concrete contexts are accepted as ‘scientific’ or not depends on the exist-
ing conceptual framework, the intentions involved in the particular scientific ac-
tivity, the accepted and applied methodology in relation to these intentions, the
regard of contextual obstacles and opportunities, and the testability of the achieved
results. Of course, all this can and must be spelled out for the historical contexts
in question, but these exercises are neither mysterious nor condemnable.
I think that history of ideas can do more for a better understanding of present
science and its demarcation. If it does not dissolve the ‘idea of science’ by uncon-
ditional contextualization, and thus put at risk its instructive potential for the pres-
ence, it can draw parallels between the present situation of science and former
periods with comparable confusions about science. For example, materialism at the
end of the 18th century and in the second half of the 19th century as well as the ex-
tensive Ignorabimus-debate in the late 19th and early 20th century reveal striking
similarities to modern scientism: overdrawn expectations and claims, tendencies to
treat philosophical problems with scientific means, and epistemological cul-de-sacs
as consequences of the attempt to capture the ‘totality of experience’ by a single
science. It would be a triviality to say that history does not repeat itself. But it is
plausible to say that the history of science repeats certain patterns of thinking. The
history of ideas can and should draw some lessons from this for present discussions
about science and in science. Understood in this sense, it is by no means part of a
postmodern intellectual movement, as it is presented by some of its contemporary
representatives. On the contrary, it is part of a continuing process of enlighten-
ment. Therefore, this short outline will end with Immanuel Kant, whose whole
project of Erkenntniskritik implied both the necessity and possibility of demarca-
tion of what he distinguished as the best of our knowledge, i. e. science:30
[…] however, the very same principle, that everything in natural science has
to be explained naturally, at the same time designates the limits of science. Be-
I. Kant: Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie (1786). Kants Werke. Akademie-




cause one has reached its outmost limit when – under all explanatory reasons
– one uses the last one which is still verified by experience. Where this ends,
and one tries to do so [i. e. to explain] by powers of matter imagined by oneself,
being subject to egregious laws not capable of any evidence, one has already
transcended science […]. 
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